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CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN THE ACCOUNTING  
AND AUDITING PROFESSION  
Aleksandar Kostadinovskl, Assist. Prof. PhD  
Olivera Georgieva Trajkovska. Assist. Prof. PhD  
Blagica Jovanova. Asst. M.Sc  
Abslracl: The corporate failures of Enron. Parmalat. WorldCom. HIH and the global 
accounting jirm Arthur Andersen have shaken the foundations of investor conjidence in the 
Iransparency, integrity and accountability ofcorporations and capital markets. The damage, 
both economic and social, has been incalculable, and the implications are far-reaching f or 
corporate manageme'!t, company directors, auditjirms and the investing public. An array of 
factors contributed to these events, but one thing is for certain - the billions of dollars fir 
corporate value lost were due in Significant part to unscrupulous management and boards of 
directors that failed to meet their responsibilities. The accounting profession, including 
auditors, also played a major role in these events. 
Key words: accounting, auditing, jinancial statements, conflicts of interest, conjidence, 
transparency. 
Introduction 
Accountancy and auditing are complex and technical processes. Its key characteristic 
is that it provides some level of assurance to users of conventional, externally-issued 
accounting reports that the representations made in those reports are consistent with lilt 
underlying economic realities. The demand for this service is, in many instances, involuntary 
because of legislative or other regulatory requirement. 
It must be remembered that the financial reports of a company are the representationS&. 
of the management and directors of that company. It is the board of directors that is, 
ultimately responsible for the content disclosed in those reports . An audit is an attestation of 
these representations by management by the auditor and assesses the truth and fairness (or in 
the minds of some, validity or integrity) of those financial reports. These highlights two'D::ilO: 
factors; (I) that the financi al reports are indeed simply representations of management 
are not primarily the responsibility of the auditor, and (2) that it is the auditor' s responsit 
to attest to the validity and reliability of those reports. [7] 
For the attestation to be of value in the market for financial information, it must 
two necessary conditions. First, the attestation needs to be competently undertaken ana_.~. 
executed. It needs to be undertaken by those with relevant expertise in the 
auditing. This will include expertise on the planning and execution of the audit itself 
may include specific specialist expertise in the industry of the auditee company. To 
competent, the audit will need to include relevant and applicable audit processes --ciItI.!IL 
methodologies and, where relevant, technologies. Secondly, for an audit to be of valu 
must be undertaken with judgments made and views held that are independent of 
management and board of the auditee company. The auditors' judgments need to test 
assertions and representations made by auditee managements. 
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The crisis of public confidence in the accounting profession arising from auditing 
failures revealed in the disastrous collapses of major corporations, is perceived as a threat not 
only to the business of auditors but to business itself. The response of governments 
worldwide to corporate scandals has been greater regulation. This response is often taken in 
the name of supporting the need for protecting the public's interest. Attention has been 
focused on flaws in the capital market and reforms to corporate reporting and 
accounting/auditing that may rectify them. Stock exchanges, global and local accounting and 
auditing standard-setters, institutional investors and other stakeholders have called for 
transparency and accountability in corporate governance, business ethics and corporate 
reporting. New laws and best practice guidance require strict monitoring of auditor 
independence, codes of ethical conduct, more disclosures, and CEO/CFO certification of 
various key statements in corporate reports. The aim of these requirements is to ensure 
effective checks and balances are in place so that good corporate governance and business 
ethics are observed. 
Regulation alone will not regain public trust. Confidence in the capital markets 
depends on confidence that the reporting and regulatory process will deliver accountability 
and transparency. This in turn depends on integrity - and integrity depends on one' s core 
ethical beliefs and behaviours. Accountants and auditors face ethical questions on a daily 
basis. Arguably the underlying principle of both professions' ethics is independence. They 
must balance their duty to their clients, their profession, society and numerous other 
slakeholders. An actual or perceived conflict of interest may arise as a result of these 
competing interests and lead to public distrust - a familiar sight in recent years. Confidence 
is quickly lost and slowly regained in these instances. A strong code of professional and 
personal ethical guidelines is a critical starting point to embedding ethical behaviour. The 
codes set out general guidelines on concepts such as independence, competence and honesty, 
as well as statements addressing specific issues of professional behaviour. These guidelines 
are backed with the power to monitor and penalise non-conforming members. 
The nature of conflicts of interest 
Conflicts of interest may involve a conflict between one's self-interest and the 
requirements of the role one occupies, or a conflict between two different roles one occupies, 
Or further, they may involve a role confusion which serves to mask a conflict of interest. 
Further, we will examine the different types of conflicts of interest that may and do arise in 
the accounting and aUd iting profession. 
The chief financial officer (CFO) traditionally is the executive officer within an 
organisation entrusted with ensuring that the company operates with financial discipline and 
propriety and not excess and impropriety. However, in a business environment where 
investors are expecting and demand ing ever-increasing earnings every financial quarter, 
CFOs come under constant pressure to 'cook the books' and make them look better than they 
, are.[6] This places CFOs in two potentially contlicting roles; the traditional role of policing 
ilia integrity and accuracy of the accounts and financial statements of a company, and the 
contemporary 'role' of making sure that the quarterly earnings of the company look the best 
lllat they can, even at times assisting this outcome by recourse to some 'creative' accounting. 
This conflict of roles creates, in tum, a contlict of interest that has the tendency, at least 
potentially. of interfering with the proper exercise of the CFO's fiduciary duty of ensuring 
the integrity and accuracy of the company's financial statements - a duty entrusted to them 
by the board of directors and the shareholders of the company, as well as prospective 
investors who require true and fair financial statements on which to base their informed 
investment decisions. 
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The role of an auditor is potentially in conflict with the role of a financial adviser, 
when one accountant performs both roles for the same client there is a conflict of interest. 
Thus we have potential conflicts of interest in accounting firms that perform audits for the 
companies for which they also provide lucrative financial consultancy and other financial 
management services. Here the latter role has a tendency to curtail the auditor's 
independence, and can thus potentially interfere with the proper exercise of an auditor's 
fiduciary duty of ensuring that a company's financial accounts present a true and fair view of 
the company's operations. The role of Arthur Andersen in Enron's collapse is a case in point, 
and crucially highlights this conflict as potentially conducive to corporate corruption. 
The ethically problematic nature of the practice of providing both consultancy and 
auditing services for clients by accountancy firms, also illustrates an important conceptual 
distinction between external instrumentalism on the one hand, and internal instrumentalism 
on the other.[5] In an external instrumentalism, the means or instrument is external to the 
end, in that it need not have any of the distinctive characteristics of the end. In internal 
instrumentalism, on the other hand, the means or instrument is internal to the end: it is 
instrumental to the end not only causally but also conceptually in that its features are also 
constitutive of the end. It serves as an instrument to the end by enforcing, reinstating, or in 
some other way bringing about a certain result, while at the same time it embodies distinctive 
characteristics of the result. 
In the case of the practice of providing both consultancy and auditing services (so '-
called 'conauditing'J, there is a conflict between the dictates of internal instrumentalism and 
those of external instrumentalism.[2] In the case of auditing, the purpose is to provide 
independent public assurance, by way of the certification offered in the auditors' report, that 
the financial statements of a corporate entity, whether private or public, present a true and 
fair view - one that can be relied upon with regard to accuracy and completeness by all 
relevant stakeholders. As such, both the means and the end of providing that type of 
independent public assurance must conform to the same conceptual and professional criteria 
of providing reliable certification as to the true and fair view of a corporate entity's financial 
statements. By contrast, the primary purpose of offering accounting and consultancy services 
to a corporation is to provide the corporation with the best financial planning, so as to 
facilitate the successful application and implementation of financial accounting practices and 
policies for maximising the corporation's profits and assets and minimising its losses and 
liabilities. Moreover, such financial consultancy is designed to enable the corporation to 
present its financial statements in the best light possible within the law so as to enhance its 
market profile, thus rendering it attractive to prospective investors. As such, the strategies of 
financial consultancy are external to the concern of ensuring that the corporation's financial 
statements are true and fair - not merely from the corporation's internal subjective 
perspective, but equally from the independent external and objective perspective of all 
relevant stakeholders. As the case of Enron lIlustrates, creative accounting policies employed 
to make the accounts look good, even when conforming to corporate law, need not reflect a 
true and fair view, especially as regards the interests of the shareholders - prospective 
investors as well as other relevant stakeholders that have an interest that the information 
provided in a corporation's financial statements is actually, and not merely cosmetically, true 
and fair. Conauditing practices seek to have it both ways: with regard to auditing they 
conform to a principle of internal instrumentalism, but with regard to consultancy they 
conform to a principle of external instrumentalism that seems to be inherently incompatible 
with the internal instrumental auditing function of providing public assurance that a 
corporation's accounts are true and fair. 
Although a conflict of interest might not in the first instance necessarily involve, or 
result in, corruption, it can nevertheless provide the conditions, and perhaps one of the 
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necessary conditions, which might facilitate corruption. Thus, it is better for all concern!:d if 
the conflict of interest is avoided or if that is not possible the conflict is disclosed and 
managed in an apparent and accountable way. In the case of Enron, for example, the 
potentially conflicting roles and interests of Arthur Andersen, in their dual capacity as both 
financial consultants and auditors of the company, may have created the conditions that 
facilitated the corrupt activities. That is, the conflict between Arthur Andersen's dual role as 
auditors and financial consultants may have been a major contributing factor in their failure 
to exercise proper dil igence and care in auditing Enron's financial statements. This was a 
care which Arthur Andersen owed to Enron's shareholders, which included a large number 
of the company's employees, a stakeholding group to whom Arthur Andersen owed a 
fiduciary duty in their capacity as auditors. That fiduciary duty was, however, undermined by 
their role as financial consultants of Enron. By virtue of that role, Arthur Andersen OWI:d a 
fiduciary duty to Enron's management, which undermined their role as independent auditors 
and made them complicit, by association ifnot by direct involvement, in dubious accounting 
practices that had the effect of concealing debt and inflating earnings. If the Arthur Andersen 
·auditors knew of those accounting practices (or should have known about them) and did not 
inform those to whom they owed a fiduciary duty - that. is, all the Enron shareholders, and 
not just the company directors who held large numbers of Enron shares - then they were 
responsible for deception, by omission if not commission, and thus responsible for the 
corrupt activities. 
The role of the Arthur Andersen auditors with regard to Enron highlights one of the 
core problems concerning conflicts of interest: role conflicts that involve a conflict of interest 
relating to outcomes concerning stakeholder groups, to whom one has conflicting fiduciary 
duties, can potentially facilitate or result in corruption. In sum, in their role as auditors 
Arthur Andersen may have participated in, or at least tolerated, the concealment and later 
destruction of evidence that revealed deceptive and misleading accounting practices and 
policies in the financial reporting of Enron's accounts which no doubt contributed to the 
corruption within the company, and thus are indirectly if not directly partly responsible for 
the corrupt accounting practices within EnrOll. 
Resolution of conflicts of interest 
The most obvious way to deal with conflicts of interest that actually or potenti !lIy 
facilitate or result in corruption is to avoid them whenever possible. Potential role confl icts 
can best be avoided through a strict division of duties and responsibilities that does not allow 
one of the opposing roles to exert undue influence over the other. For example, the divi!:ion 
ofaccounting responsibilities between the cashiering and banking functions on the one hand, 
and the accounts payable and receivable functions on the other hand, reduces the risk of a 
conflict of interest between those two functions that may otherwise facilitate potential 
corruption.[3] 
A further way of reducing conflicts of interest arising from conflicting role 
obligations is to institute a strict division and separation of roles between membe~ of 
professions or other institutions that owe fiduciary duties to different groups of stakeholders 
with potentially conflicting interests. For example, in the case of accountants, conflict:; of 
interest can best be avoided through the strict division and separation of the auditing and 
financial consultancy functions within an accounting finn. However, th is control may no·: be 
adequate to avoid conflicts of interest in situations, as the ones at present, where fees from 
financial consultancy services far exceed auditing fees. One possible solution to this problem 
is to increase audit fees substantially to at least match those from financial consultancy 
services, or, if that is not possible, require accounting firms to choose to undertake one but 
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not both of the two potentially conflicting roles. Under this envisaged scheme, accounting 
firms that specialise in auditing would be precluded from acting as financial consultants to 
their clients, or alternatively, trom auditing the accounts of their financial consultancy 
clients. The problem, of course, with either suggestion is that they might not prove to be 
feasible or practical for implementation. 
It may not, however, always be possible to avoid conflicts of interest, so the next best 
solution is to disclose them. One of the main conditions conducive to corruption is 
concealment or secrecy, which enables the agency of the corrupt person or group to remain 
undetected, thus allowing the corrupt person or group to engage in corruption with impunity 
and without fear of retribution. Accordingly, disclosure of conflicts of interest, if exercised 
stringently and properly, can be an effective control measure against corruption by 
eliminating or at least reducing one of its contributing factors, namely concealment or 
secrecy. 
Apparent conflicts of interest can be as ethically problematic as actual conflicts of 
interest, because of their tendency to mislead people and create in their minds uncertainty 
concerning the reliability and integrity of the judgment of those trom whom they have a 
legitimate expectation of a fiduciary duty of trust. The best way to avoid such apparent 
conflicts of interest is by disclosing sufficient information to demonstrate that there are no 
actual or potential conflicts of interest. This is important because a suspicion of corruption 
regarding a person or institution created by merely apparent conflicts of interest can be as 
damaging to public confidence in that person or institution as actual or potential conflicts of 
interest. It is precisely for this reason that transparency as an anti-corruption measure is 
important, not only as a way of preventing corruption through eliminating or reducing one of 
its key contributing conditions - namely, concealment or secrecy - but also for preserving 
and maintaining public confidence in persons, professions; practices, processes and public 
institutions by eliminating or at least reducing the appearance of conflicts of interest. 
Conclusion' 
Role of auditor is potentially in conflict with the role of financial adviser when the 
same person performs both roles for a cl ient; there is a conflict of interest. Thus we have 
conflicts of interest in accounting firms that perform audits for the companies for which they 
also provide lucrative financial consultancy and other financial management services. Here 
the latter role has a tendency to curtail or diminish the auditor's independence, and can thus 
potentially interfere with the proper exercise of an auditor's fiduciary duty of ensuring that a 
company's financial statements present a true and fair view of the company's operations. 
The role of Arthur Andersen in Enron's collapse is a case, showing how conflicts of interest 
in auditing can contribute to and result in corruption. Conflicts of interest in auditing should 
thus be avoided wherever possible, as their mere disclosure does not remove the conflict of 
interest and hence does not remove its capacity to cause corruption, as in the Enron case. 
The corporate collapses and the role of accountants and auditors in it, contribute to 
decreasing the credibility of profession, public trust has been badly shaken, and 
profession has learned the hard way that it should not take its position in society for granted. 
As the capital market evolved alongside the rapid growth of technology and globalisation, 
there was an unhealthy shift in attitudes in the corporate world, one that has also existed in 
earlier times in the development of modem corporations. It is important to understand this 
phenomenon if any proposed reforms are to be effective in the future. ContemporarY 
approaches to teaching accounting and auditing ethics tend to be unproductive by abstracting 
ethics trom its practical applications. Teaching of ethics needs to be firmly grounded and 
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integrated into the practical and applied experience of accounting and aUditing students and 
practitioners. The emphasis must be upon the development and practice of the applied skills 
of values clarification, ethical decision-making and ethical policy-setting. Although the 
teaching of ethics to accountants and auditors cannot eliminate all cases of professional 
misconduct, it can assist in minimising such occurrences by waking professionals out of their 
state of drowsy morality and inspiring them to develop their professional competence (or 
virtues) and promote excellence in accounting and auditing practice. 
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